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Introduction
The emergence of a middle class has been 
identified as an important factor driving economic 
and political transitions in Asia and Africa. Class 
has been ‘happening’ in the broader Pacific 
region1 for some time, as Gewertz and Errington 
(1999:2) observed of Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
Nevertheless, to date, little systematic policy 
attention has been given to questions of class. 
We believe that the concept of an emerging 
middle class provides a useful entry point for 
understanding significant developmental and 
political transformations in Timor-Leste and 
Melanesia and is important for informing 
development policies. However, in order to explore 
the potential consequences that an emergent 
middle class may have, it is necessary to first 
consider how such a class can be identified in the 
region. We have chosen to focus on Timor-Leste, 
PNG and Solomon Islands because these countries 
are undergoing comparable social and economic 
transitions, many of which correlate strongly with 
the emergence of a middle class. Such changes 
include rapid economic growth driven by resource 
booms in Timor-Leste and PNG, associated 
formalisation of regional economies, deepening 
urbanisation, increasing social integration with 
metropolitan powers through growing diaspora 
communities, changing consumption patterns, 
and the transformative impacts of social media 
following recent internet and mobile telephone 
penetration.
This paper has three substantive sections. First, 
it considers contemporary discussions of class and 
development in Asia and other developing regions. 
Second, the paper develops a multidimensional 
framework for identifying an emergent middle 
class, drawing on a range of economic, political 
and social criteria. Finally, the paper uses these 
criteria to examine recent developments in each 
of three case study countries and then draws some 
conclusions on the developmental and political 
significance of an emergent middle class in the 
broader Pacific region with a view to establishing a 
longer term research agenda.
The Developmental and Political Significance 
of the Middle Class
The international community, including leading 
development agencies such as the World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), has become increasingly 
interested in the developmental significance of 
the emerging middle classes in late developing 
countries (ADB 2010; Easterly 2001; Ferreira 
et al. 2013; OECD 2010; Ravallion 2009). 
Such interest reflects the apparent correlation 
between the emergence of middle classes and 
wider transformative processes of economic and 
political change. Emergent middle classes have 
been variously associated with nascent processes 
of capitalist consolidation (Adelman and Morris 
1967; Weber 1976 [1930]), urbanisation (Boone 
2012; Huntington 1968; Pye 1969; Reissman 
1970), globalisation and cosmopolitanism. As an 
analytical concept, an idealised middle class is 
often understood to be at the vanguard of processes 
of economic modernisation and development, 
resulting from a combination of middle-class values 
and economic behaviours (consumption, thrift, 
entrepreneurialism) (Banerjee and 
Duflo 2007; Easterly 2001; Kharas 
2010). Moreover, the middle class 
is said to be naturally politically 
liberal, supporting democratic 
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transitions and pluralism (Fukuyama 1993; Koo 
1991; Lipset 1959; O’Donnell et al. 1986; Van 
Beuningen 2007). In this context, policy makers 
are interested in how to support the consolidation 
of a middle class through deliberate policy and 
institutional arrangements (ADB 2010:29–36).
More critical analysis grounded in particular 
country contexts (Chen and Lu 2011; Crouch 
1993; Dong 1993; Jones 1998) points to more 
ambiguous roles for the middle classes in processes 
of economic and political development. Middle 
classes may derive political influence in developing 
countries by playing a role as an intermediary 
class (Khan 2010) that mediates processes of 
economic and political transformation on behalf 
of foreign investors, local capitalists and other 
elite interests. As a substantive social group 
in any country, the middle class may play an 
important role in consolidating distinctive political 
settlements determinative of inclusive or exclusive 
political orders (Barbara et al. 2014; Ingram 2014; 
Slater 2010).
Policy interest in the emerging middle classes 
has followed broader economic transitions 
occurring in different regions. The success of the 
East Asian developmental states and the general 
growth of middle classes in Asian countries 
has spurred particular policy interest among 
international development agencies such as the 
Asian Development Bank and World Bank in how 
the middle classes might be supported to catalyse 
development (ADB 2010). The identification of 
a burgeoning middle class with rapid economic 
development in many Asian countries, particularly 
China but also the developmental states of South 
Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia, and 
more recently India, has spawned a significant 
policy literature on the relationship between the 
middle class and economic development, and 
how policy support for an emergent middle class 
may help catalyse economic transitions. More 
recent economic transitions in Africa (African 
Development Bank 2011) and the Americas 
(Ferreira et al. 2013; OECD 2010) have similarly 
given rise to significant policy interest in emergent 
regional middle classes.
To date, interest in the Pacific middle classes 
has largely been confined to anthropological 
studies (Besnier 2009; Cox 2011, 2013, 2014a; 
Cox and Macintyre 2014; Gewertz and Errington 
1999; Gooberman-Hill 1999; Hau’ofa 1987; James 
2003; Martin 2013; Sissons 1998). Unlike Asia, 
the relevance of the middle classes as significant 
development actors in PNG, Solomon Islands 
and Timor-Leste has received little academic or 
policy attention. This is in part because the utility 
of the middle class as an analytical category in 
the Pacific has been assumed to be limited, not 
least because the region has been understood 
(by colonial administrators and local elites alike) 
as one split between (modern) urban ‘elites’ and 
the (traditional) subsistence ‘grassroots’ (Cox 
2013, 2014a) — a division that cannot account 
for new economic aspirations or socio-economic 
and cultural change, except in moralistic or 
nostalgic terms (Dickson-Waiko 2003; Gewertz 
and Errington 1999; Golub 2014; Hau’ofa 1987). 
This pervasive regional ideology fails to capture 
the complexities of societal change in a region 
characterised by rural subsistence economies, 
economic underdevelopment and political 
clientelism; but also by rapid economic and social 
change, increasing urbanisation and a range of 
post-colonial fragilities.
One likely reason for the policy community’s 
relative neglect of the emerging middle class in 
the Pacific is the narrow economic framing of 
the analytical category. Much policy analysis, 
particularly that led by multilateral financial 
institutions such as the World Bank and ADB, 
tends to emphasise the economic consequences of 
an emergent middle class, privileging correlations 
between the middle class and economic growth as 
the focus of study (ADB 2010; Banerjee and Duflo 
2007; Easterly 2001; Kharas 2010; OECD 2010). 
Such analyses rely heavily on economic measures 
such as income, expenditure and/or consumption 
to identify the middle class and ascertain its 
consequences. Based on such measures, the Pacific 
fares poorly, where economies are characterised 
by high degrees of informality and subsistence 
agriculture with low per capita incomes. As such, 
policy literatures on the emergent middle class have 
not translated well into a Pacific context which 
is generally treated as the exception to the rule. 
For example, a recent major study by the ADB on 
economic development in the Asia–Pacific region 
included a special focus on the role of emerging 
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middle classes, but largely excluded the Pacific 
(ADB 2010).
There are, however, a broad range of analytical 
criteria relevant to the broader Pacific region, 
by which a middle class might be identified. 
Political scientists, economists and sociologists 
have opted for different approaches in the 
definition of the middle class, reflecting different 
conceptual interests in engaging with social class. 
Certainly, efforts to identify the middle class have 
been plagued by the ambiguity of the concept 
(Barnes 1995; Kharas 2010). Indeed, some have 
questioned the utility of the category ‘middle 
class’ as an explanatory tool, suggesting that class 
interests should be subsumed into more useful 
analytic concepts such as social movements 
and collective action (Barnes 1995:172–92). ‘In 
sociological terms, a social class is expected to 
have a certain homogeneity of characteristics, 
and possibly a consciousness of its identity and 
role as a group’ (OECD 2010:73). Sociological 
definitions have focused on a range of criteria such 
as property ownership, educational credentials 
(Weber 1961), employment status (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1992) and skills to identify the middle 
class. Historical analysis of the middle class has 
focused on the impact of emergent middle-
class values and interests on shaping economic 
and political development transitions, such as 
Weber’s (1976 [1930]) analysis of the ‘Protestant 
work ethic’. Political scientists have also been 
interested in the relationship of the middle class 
to processes of democratic consolidation. Using 
a multidimensional approach that looks beyond 
narrow economic indicators, it becomes apparent 
that the concept of an emergent middle class is 
relevant to understanding contemporary processes 
of economic and political change currently 
underway in the Pacific.
Identifying the Middle Class? Key Analytical 
Categories
Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
provide a full review of debates over social class, 
this section identifies a practical set of analytical 
criteria that might be used to identify an emergent 
middle class in the Pacific region. An effective 
definition of the emerging middle class must 
acknowledge both significant material differences 
across regional middle classes and qualitative 
differences in terms of middle-class values, 
aspirations and behaviours. It should also, ideally, 
account for the structural factors and distinct 
development contexts that give rise to quantitatively 
and qualitatively different middle-class formations. 
There is a growing recognition among policy 
makers that a multidimensional approach to the 
study of class is required, with a range of conceptual 
tools employed depending on the focus of the 
research. As the ADB’s influential report on the rise 
of Asia’s middle class put it:
… there is really no single, universally 
accepted definition of what constitutes a 
middle class. Nor is there a need for one. The 
definition should depend on the purpose at 
hand … if the objective is to compare the 
characteristics of the middle class in a country 
to those of the poor or of the rich, or to study 
the middle class in a particular country over 
time, a relative approach or an approach 
based on non-income characteristics might be 
appropriate. (ADB 2010:13)
In this section, we draw on recent studies of 
the emerging middle classes in Asia and Africa 
that have a similar purpose in investigating 
social, political and developmental changes in an 
underdeveloped region. Modifying some of this 
work, we propose six analytical categories that 
provide a multidimensional approach to the study 
of the Pacific middle classes:
1) income





Applying these six analytical categories will 
allow us to capture some of the important political 
and developmental trends that are emerging in 
the Pacific.
1. Income
Income measures of the middle class, arising 
predominantly from economic studies, draw on 
a range of relative and absolute methodologies 
that locate a middle class on income, investment 
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and expenditure scales (per capita incomes, per 
capita consumption etc. (Easterly 2001; Kharas 
2010)). A number of approaches can be identified 
in the economic literature, reflecting differing 
assumptions and study objectives (ADB 2010:13). 
For example, the World Bank (2007) has defined 
the middle class in absolute terms as having 
incomes falling between USD4000 and USD17,000 
in 2000 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. 
By contrast, Banerjee and Duflo (2007) define as 
middle class those with per capita expenditures 
of between USD2 and USD10 per day (adjusted 
for PPP). This compares with the United States 
poverty line of USD13 per day and raises important 
questions on the utility of stand-alone income 
measures. Easterly (2001) used the range of the 
20th and 80th consumption distribution percentiles 
to identify middle-class individuals, a measure 
that does not map well onto the study countries 
where, typically, 75–85 per cent of the population 
are believed to rely on subsistence agriculture and 
have minimal access to cash. Kharas (2010) has 
used daily consumption expenditure of USD10 to 
USD100 per person.
Identifying the middle class by income 
measures is problematic, particularly when trying 
to draw cross-country comparisons. As a statistical 
measure of the ‘middle’ which can be applied 
in any country context, identifying the middle 
class as those falling within relative in-country 
income ranges risks avoiding critical questions 
about whether middle-class incomes allow income 
earners to participate in middle-class lifestyles. The 
ability of an income to deliver a lifestyle recognised 
as middle class is inevitably bound to its particular 
socio-economic context.
Both absolute and relative income-based 
methodologies can be problematic when 
comparing the middle class across countries, 
particularly between developed and developing 
countries. Most economic definitions agree that 
the new global middle classes are quantitatively 
different from the middle classes of high-income 
countries. This is not only because the income 
brackets are much lower (an income of USD2–4 
per day would be considered well below the 
poverty line in the United States or Western 
Europe), but also because these new middle classes 
are emerging in very different social and political 
contexts (Guarin and Knorringa 2013:3). Reliance 
on income levels to determine class risks setting 
arbitrary thresholds (Burger, Steenekamp et al. 
2015) that group together homogeneous cohorts 
of individuals without paying broader attention 
to life chances and other middle-class attributes 
and affinities. Reliance on income measures alone, 
while important, lacks sufficient analytical depth to 
provide a useful basis for interrogating the broader 
developmental and political significance of the 
middle class.
Some researchers have sought to distinguish 
between the ‘developing world’s middle class’ and 
the ‘Western world middle class’ (Ravallion 2009). 
Birdsall (2007) has developed a hybrid definition 
combining relative and absolute approaches, setting 
an income threshold that defines the middle class 
regardless of country context. She defines middle-
class individuals as those consuming ‘the equivalent 
of US10 or more per day, but who fall below the 
90th percentile in the income distribution’ (Birdsall 
2007, cited in ADB 2010:5). This approach reflects 
an assessment that those earning below this 
absolute threshold ‘are too poor to be middle class 
in any society’ while excluding those ‘people who 
are rich in their own society’ (ADB 2010:5).
Income-based measures of the middle class 
point to the importance of economic growth in 
explaining the growth of the middle class (ADB 
2010:15). Countries benefiting from resource-
based growth, or deeper integration into global 
economies, are likely to experience expansion 
of their middle class. Research has shown that 
middle-class participation in regional and global 
labour markets has been important in generating 
remittances contributing to reductions in poverty, 
with the educated middle class better positioned to 
access migration opportunities and to obtain better 
paying jobs (ADB 2010:21).
Similarly, resource-driven economic growth 
across Melanesia and in Timor-Leste over the past 
decade suggests there is an emerging economic 
foundation for the rise of a middle class in these 
countries. Further research is required to determine 
whether the level and distribution of increasing 
national income is enabling the rise of a significant 
middle class. To the degree that income changes are 
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occurring in the Pacific region, the relatively small 
size of formal economies means that the number 
of people earning absolute incomes sufficient 
to support regionally significant middle-class 
consumption and lifestyle aspirations is likely to 
be small.
2. Occupation, skills and education
Sociological studies have emphasised the 
importance of education, occupation and skills 
as indicators of class position. The middle class 
are said to occupy a distinct place in the social 
hierarchy of capitalist economies, reflected 
in the particular jobs they hold in the service 
or tertiary sectors (ADB 2010:23). Middle-
class occupations are generally understood to 
encompass professional, managerial, technical 
and administrative roles (Burger, Steenekamp 
et al. 2015). There are a range of stereotypical 
occupations which may be recognised as middle 
class, including public servants, lawyers and 
the medical profession. Social scientists have 
developed a broad range of measures that seek 
to categorise occupation types and use these 
to make assessments of the nature of social 
stratification in particular societies (e.g. Lambert 
and Bihagen 2014). Such measures recognise 
the interrelationships between the division of 
labour, inequality and occupation. These include 
occupational prestige, occupation-linked job 
characteristics such as education requirements, and 
income and employment status (Ganzeboom and 
Treiman 1996). The utility of complex occupational 
measures, most based on developed capitalist 
economies, is questionable in developing country 
contexts where the range of occupations can be 
expected to be fewer and the status and prestige 
differences across occupations arguably more stark. 
ADB research of emerging middle classes across 
Asia has found large variations in occupation 
characteristics across countries (ADB 2010:25).
Employment measures can also be used to 
identify the emergent middle class. Research by 
the ADB on the emerging middle class in Asia has 
found that the middle class are both self-employed 
and employed as wage and salary earners. However, 
formal wage and salary employment is the most 
important form of middle-class employment, 
particularly for the middle and upper middle classes 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2007). For the lower middle 
classes — those earning between USD2 and USD4 
per day for the ADB study — self-employment 
becomes increasingly important as individuals ‘buy 
jobs’ (Banerjee and Duflo 2007). In developing 
countries the core of the middle class may be based 
in the public sector and be heavily dependent on 
the state. The ADB has observed wide variations 
in the proportion of the middle class working in 
public sector employment across countries, ranging 
from 17 per cent in India to 74 per cent in Vietnam 
(ADB 2010:25). The assumption that many middle-
class people are entrepreneurs is problematic in 
developing countries where self-employment can 
be a marginal and precarious activity. Scholars 
of China (e.g. Hsiao 2014) refer to the ‘marginal 
middle class’ to encompass clerical workers, 
street traders and sellers. In developing country 
contexts ‘the average middle-class person is not 
an entrepreneur in waiting’ and ‘[i]f they do run a 
business, it is usually small and not very profitable’ 
(Kharas 2010:10).
If occupation and skills are important deter-
minants of membership of the middle class, then 
education itself becomes a decisive factor in class 
formation. Weber (1961) identified the importance 
of education qualifications as key credentials 
underpinning access to middle-class occupations 
and social status. Bourdieu (1984) has identified 
education as an important way by which cultural 
capital can be obtained, which is necessary to access 
membership of the middle class. Education is 
important as a mechanism of social formation and 
the production of class ideologies and values. For 
example, higher education has been found to play 
a fundamental role in processes of elite formation, 
nation-building and developmental leadership 
(Brannelly et al. 2011; Foster 1995). According to 
the ADB (2010:25), ‘university education is much 
more common in the middle class than in the poor 
population’, but with significant cross-country 
variation measured across Asia. Education is also a 
key mechanism by which social class is transmitted 
across generations (Ferreira et al. 2013). The middle 
class are generally more educated than the poor, 
and ‘are more likely to invest in the schooling of 
their children’ (ADB 2010:21).
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The precariousness of development transitions, 
including in the Pacific, means that investments 
in human capital do not necessarily guarantee 
economic advancement or consolidation (Sharp 
et al. 2015), particularly for young people who are 
educated but not in regular or secure employment 
(Standing 2009). For example, analyses attuned to 
the role of education in regional class development 
would be sensitive to the distinction between 
domestic educational pathways, and scholarship-
based foreign education. In many Pacific countries, 
access to the latter increasingly depends upon 
intergenerational privilege and connections, 
suggesting that current inequalities may become 
entrenched and amplified over time.
3. Vulnerability
Being middle class requires an ability to maintain 
social status and lifestyle options that derive 
from one’s occupation. This, in turn, depends on 
successful management of risk and uncertainty, and 
continuity of income and employment (Sharp et al. 
2015). According to Banerjee and Duflo (2007:26), 
‘Nothing seems more middle class than the fact of 
having a steady well-paying job’.
The degree to which the middle class is 
economically secure will reflect a broad range of 
factors including the nature of production but also 
institutional arrangements regarding employment 
security, labour market bargaining power and the 
relative scarcity of skills (Burger, Steenekamp et al. 
2015). Goldthorpe and McKnight (2004) note the 
links between class and economic vulnerability, 
whereby the security of employment contracts is 
a significant factor influencing economic security, 
economic stability and economic prospects. The 
middle class are middle class in part because 
they have been able to benefit from more secure 
employment relationships leading to predictable 
income. Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) have 
developed a vulnerability approach to define class 
in which non-poor households who nevertheless 
face significant chances of returning to poverty 
cannot be considered as middle class. Their 
vulnerability approach sets a minimum income 
floor as a basis for identifying the middle class, 
because such a floor ‘allows individuals to protect 
themselves from falling into poverty over time’ 
(Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2014:26). According 
to Burger, Steenekamp et al.,
This distinction between vulnerability and 
security aligns with other important divides, 
including the separation between financial 
independence and reliance and on a short 
and longer time horizon, which in turn 
has associations with savings behavior and 
human capital investment decisions. (Burger, 
Steenekamp et al. 2015:31)
The rapid growth of Asia’s middle class has 
been characterised by a significant degree of 
vulnerability (ADB 2010:32). This reflects the 
importance of self-employment and semi-formal 
employment in accounting for household economic 
transitions, whereby the emergent middle classes 
are thus distinguishable from the poor but, in many 
cases, only just (Guarin and Knorringa 2013). 
Differences characterised by relatively modest 
income differentials may be highly sensitive to 
economic shocks. Following the 1997/98 Asian 
Financial Crisis, the number of middle-class 
individuals in Indonesia (earning between USD2 
and USD20 per day) fell by some 4.8 million or 
10 per cent (ADB 2010:32).
Middle-class responses to vulnerability may 
thus result in very different class-based approaches 
to development and politics. The ADB (2010:35) 
observes that ‘[t]he evidence strongly indicates 
the role that formation of stable jobs, increased 
education, and safety nets can play in allowing 
individuals to reduce their vulnerability to poverty 
and increase their chances of remaining middle 
class.’ In developed economies, the middle class 
has responded to vulnerability through the 
construction of welfare states as core features of 
national political settlements (Esping-Andersen 
1990). In the context of weak development and 
scarce economic resources, where the economy 
is characterised by a high degree of precarity, 
constructing effective social protection systems can 
be difficult (OECD 2010). In such circumstances, 
middle-class strategies designed to reduce 
vulnerability may be directed at accessing ‘extra-
local resources’, and become a key project for 
middle-class individuals. This requires establishing 
‘dependable links to the outside world, through 
which one can claim access to material resources 
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(e.g. money, objects, travel) and symbolic ones (e.g. 
taste, knowledge, style)’ (Besnier 2009:218).
4. Self-identification
Whereas identification of the middle class may be 
discerned objectively through measures of income, 
vulnerability and employment, it can also be 
assessed through subjective measures based on self-
identification. This approach relies on perceptions 
of relative social standing and the tendency of 
individuals to associate with other individuals who 
share similar characteristics and experiences. It 
is important to recognise that being middle class 
is not the same as feeling middle class. In a 2010 
review, the OECD found that only 40 per cent of 
Latin American citizens who identified as middle 
class could be considered so using conventional 
income measures of class (OECD 2010:74). 
The ADB (2010:12) has found a wide variation 
across Asian countries regarding individual 
understandings of what forms the middle class. 
A significant proportion of high-income earners 
consistently identify themselves as middle class, as 
do many precarious wage earners.
Self-identification of class is nevertheless an 
important means of identification because it points 
to more symbolic and aspirational markers, such 
as material consumption and the nature of social 
participation. According to Besnier,
… being middle class is not measured 
in terms of whether one ‘belongs’ to an 
objectively defined grouping, but is rather a 
matter of whether one engages in social and 
cultural projects that have no particular end 
in sight, but that mobilise time and energy 
in the daily existence of those concerned. 
(Besnier 2009:218)
The few studies of the emerging middle 
class in the Pacific have tended to focus on 
ideational and self-identified characteristics. A 
number of anthropological studies have used the 
concept of the middle class to investigate social 
transformations in the region (Besnier 2009; 
Cox 2011, 2013, 2014a; Foster 2008; Gewertz 
and Errington 1999; Golub 2014; Hau’ofa 1987; 
Monsell-Davis 1993; Sissons 1998), not least 
around changing gender roles (Cox and Macintyre 
2014; Dickson-Waiko 2003; Macintyre 2011; Spark 
2011, 2014, 2015). These studies focus on how new 
social distinctions are being made on the basis of 
income, profession, education or cultural capital 
(Gewertz and Errington 1999; Golub 2014; Hau’ofa 
1987). Changes in income have driven shifts in 
consumer behaviour in relation to clothing, food, 
communications, transportation and leisure. These 
new practices and technologies may in turn become 
markers of middle-class cosmopolitan connection, 
ownership of national identity or distinction from 
‘grassroots’ lower classes or traditional communities 
(Besnier 2009; Foster 2002; Gewertz and Errington 
1999; cf. Burger, Louw et al. 2015). There is also 
interest in the development of national identity and 
how this interacts with more cosmopolitan outlooks 
and behaviours (Besnier 2009; Cox 2011; Cox and 
Macintyre 2014; Foster 2002, 2008; Macintyre 
2011; Spark 2014, 2015). Middle-class consumption 
patterns may also be symbolically important in 
developing countries with access to consumer 
goods signifying status and prestige (Besnier 2009; 
Foster 2002).
Subjective definitions of class raise the 
prospect of a potentially significant gap between 
notionally objective income-based measures of 
class and perceived social status. The aspiration to 
become middle class may be important in shaping 
unfolding economic and political transitions and 
emerging political settlements. In some cases, the 
precariousness of one’s middle-class status may also 
be a source of tension. For example, Cox (2014a) 
has observed that, as the rising cost of living in 
PNG leaves middle-class salary earners feeling 
precarious, many are complaining that they no 
longer feel that they enjoy the benefits of citizenship 
available to a previous generation of educated 
Papua New Guineans. In other cases, middle-class 
aspirations may feed into broader nation-building 
agendas. For example, in Solomon Islands, a small 
middle-class leadership group was important in the 
decision to establish the Solomon Islands National 
University which had ambitious nation-building 
aspirations (Barbara and Walsh 2015).
While subjective, perceptions of being middle 
class may be significant in driving processes of 
economic and social change:
Arguably, the ideal for a society is not simply 
to have many people in the middle sectors, 
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but rather many people who really identify 
with the post-modern and non-materialistic 
values of the self-described middle class. 
If being middle-class is seen as feeling 
middle-class, then it is educators, opinion 
formers, thinkers and artists — rather than 
just economists or governments driven by 
material well-being or economic growth — 
who will be the agents of effective change. 
(OECD 2010:75)
5. Urbanisation
Emerging middle classes in transition economies 
outside the Pacific region have had a strong 
urban dimension. The growth of a middle class 
in Asia correlated strongly with processes of 
industrialisation, advances in farming technology 
and shifts from rural to urban-based industrial 
modes of production. The density of urban towns 
and cities supports economies of scale, divisions of 
labour, and technological innovations which enable 
higher levels of economic growth and income (Fox 
2013:10). The sociology of urban communities also 
lends itself to forms of intense civic participation 
and monetised market relations, and thus supports 
the consolidation of middle-class values and 
political behaviours. ‘Urban living transforms 
social organisation, social values, and the role of 
the individual in community and society’ (ibid.). 
National sentiment in ethno-linguistically diverse 
emerging states tends to be most prominent 
in urban enclaves. Urban centres are typically 
more ethnically heterogeneous, further removed 
from traditional communities and authorities 
in the regions, and exhibit a higher degree of 
integration into the political, economic (and formal 
educational-linguistic) life of the nation-state 
(Leach et al. 2013). Reviewing the interest of early 
development theorists in processes of urbanisation, 
Fox notes:
Urban living was … seen as a stimulus for 
the cultivation of social attitudes, beliefs, and 
values conducive to capitalist development, 
as well as a force for political consolidation 
and the development of nationalism. In 
urban areas social relations based on kinship, 
clan and tribe are augmented and replaced 
by those based on occupation, income, 
location of residence and forms of recreation. 
Social mobility, both horizontal and vertical, 
is greater in cities due to the diversity of 
economic activities and the possibility to 
obtain regular waged employment. And 
urbanisation has long been associated with 
reduced fertility rates, which results in slower 
population growth and enhanced freedom for 
women as they gain more control over their 
reproductive cycle. (Fox 2013:11)
The urban basis of the emergent middle class is 
likely to support very different forms of economic 
and political development to those arising from 
the subsistence/rural economies that characterise 
large parts of the Pacific. Rural–urban migration 
from highly traditional clan societies fosters new 
or hybrid forms of sociality in urban centres, 
creating identities which are more contestable, 
politically, ideologically, or morally (Martin 2013). 
Urbanisation also results in changing political 
and social aspirations and thus can drive political 
development including the emergence of political 
parties. A property-owning urban middle class 
will engage with politics in distinctive ways, 
shaping how power is ordered in societies ‘since 
urban populations are more likely to demand 
systematic attention by the state to development 
policy, aligning spending and developing the tax 
base accordingly’ (Craig and Porter 2014:12). In 
addition, regional societies with strong restriction 
on foreign ownership of land may see the rise 
of a local ‘comprador’ class, fronting foreign 
investments.
Fox (2013) notes the ambiguous evidence 
regarding whether urbanisation contributes to 
or reduces political unrest. On the one hand, 
social proximity within urban areas may be more 
conducive to collective action and/or political 
unrest, including by making political organisation 
easier. On the other, urbanisation can dampen 
political unrest by facilitating public good provision 
and improving living standards, supporting social 
integration and unifying nationalist sentiments. 
Of particular relevance to Melanesia, emerging 
commercial, educational and technocratic middle 
classes are held to be instrumental to nation-
building processes, emerging primarily in urbanised 
capital city contexts as the ‘vanguard’ of newer 
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cultures, removed from the localism of traditional 
rural areas.2
While industrialisation is limited in the Pacific, 
urban centres have been subject to high levels of 
internal migration after independence for those in 
search of service jobs or educational opportunity. 
Rural–urban migration has been a major feature 
of Pacific societies, and a considerable source of 
social tension. In colonial times, there was tight 
control over in-migration to towns, which were 
largely reserved for the colonial and commercial 
elites (Koczberski et al. 2001; Ranck 1977). This 
pattern changed dramatically with independence. 
According to Haberkorn (1992), Melanesia’s urban 
population tripled from a mere 7 per cent of the 
region’s total population in 1955 to 20 per cent by 
1985, which he attributes to rural–urban migration. 
At current rates, he claims (Haberkorn 2008) urban 
populations in Melanesia are set to double in the 
next 25 years. In PNG, much of the recent urban 
migrant population has become concentrated in 
peri-urban fringe settlements, which have become 
a source of crime and sometimes social friction 
(Goddard 2005), although also home to many 
middle-class salary earners (Sharp et al. 2015). In 
Timor-Leste, almost half of Dili’s population is 
composed of internal migrants, and most of this 
inward migration is recent (Neupert and Lopes 
2006).3 Understanding the nature of urbanisation 
including the distinctive nature of urban political 
economies will be important to identifying and 
understanding the political and developmental 
significance of the regional middle class.
6. Political participation
The middle class is assumed to be socially 
significant in its presumed impacts on politics. 
While the middle class should not be understood 
as sharing a common ideology or having 
homogeneous political views and priorities, its 
political significance lies in part in an underlying 
set of values which are influential in framing 
local and national politics. The notion of class 
consensus has been raised by scholars and policy 
makers to distinguish the middle class as a political 
entity from other forms of social movements and 
collective action (Barnes 1995; Easterly 2001). 
As a social class, the middle class are potentially 
politically significant because members of a social 
class are likely to behave in similar ways in similar 
situations (Barnes 1995; Standing 2009), and 
constitute a scaled political constituency capable 
of influencing local politics in ways distinct 
from small-scale lobby groups and civil society 
organisations.
Understanding class dynamics and context 
can therefore assist us in understanding processes 
of social change and development. To the degree 
that the middle class constitutes a substantive 
proportion of the population, the middle class can 
be expected to provide social ballast in changing 
societies and potentially help stabilise political 
settlements. The issue of scale raises important 
questions in the Pacific region where an emergent 
middle class is likely to be small.
Recent policy interest in the emerging middle 
classes has focused on the significance of middle-
class values and their compatibility with good 
governance and economic liberalisation. Donor 
interest in the emerging middle class stems in 
part from concerns with political accountability, 
where it is assumed that middle-class self-interest 
ensures a strong predisposition to support capitalist 
production, good governance (or at least reliable 
contract enforcement) and political stability. In 
reviewing data on Asian middle-class values, the 
ADB (2010:26) found the ‘middle class to hold 
significantly more progressive views in terms of 
openness to market competition, gender equality, 
upward mobility, trust, political activism, and 
technology than the lower class’.
One way in which the emergent middle class 
may be identified is in how they participate in 
politics, and the nature of their active citizenship 
(Cox 2009). In developed countries, one of 
the stabilising benefits conferred by a growing 
middle class may be its contribution to social 
capital. Signifiers of an emerging middle class in 
developing countries may be a deepening ecology 
of social organisations such as church groups, civil 
society organisations and voluntary associations. 
More formalised political organisation may be 
an important marker of political transition as the 
middle class moves to protect urban, material 
interests at the expense of traditional tribal and 
village affinities. As noted in the previous section, 
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the urban basis of the emerging middle class lends 
itself to more active forms of political participation.
Analyses of the Asian middle classes highlight 
the importance of specific developmental 
contexts, and situated individual case studies. 
Thus for example, urban Thai middle classes 
may oppose authoritarianism, but fear the 
extension of democratic power to rural citizens, 
who they regard as uneducated and likely to 
upset political settlements and sound policy 
formation (Laothamatas 1996). Thus, while they 
may act as ‘critical citizens’ (Norris 1999) — 
holding government to account — they may not 
necessarily be viewed as enthusiastic democrats. 
For their part, rural classes may see the state as a 
‘countervailing power’ and a means of checking the 
economic power of higher classes (Albritton and 
Bureekul 2012).
The middle class may occupy key positions 
in patrimonial political economies in which 
personalised authority systems have merged 
with ‘impersonal elements of governance, like 
a legal system that demarcates the public and 
private domain, or an administrative code with 
formal criteria for staff hiring and promotion’ 
(Kelsall 2011:77). The middle class may also be 
beneficiaries of political patronage, and equally 
implicated in political economies in which political 
order is based on clientelism and corruption 
(Pitcher et al. 2009). Absent a developed capitalist-
based middle class, political elites come from 
‘intermediate classes’ comprising educated 
and petty bourgeoisie (Khan 2010).4 Political 
entrepreneurs from this class have leadership skills 
well suited to forms of development underpinning 
local politics. For example, educated Solomon 
Islanders are well placed to act as intermediaries 
between local communities and foreign logging 
companies (Hameiri 2012). This intermediary 
class is politically fragmented and does not share 
common interests focused on the viability of the 
capitalist economy.
Alternatively, when confronted by a more 
dominant economic class, middle classes may 
adopt more democratic attitudes making strategic 
alliances with working classes or peasantry 
(Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Tang et al. (2009) 
conclude that whether the Chinese middle class 
proves to be an agent of democratisation will be 
determined more by its perceptions of its own 
strategic interests in particular developmental 
contexts. Other case studies in Asia and Latin 
America suggest that middle-class attitudes to 
democratisation are ambiguous, especially where 
these classes are dependent on state contracts or 
employment and may be essentially oriented against 
political change. We anticipate being able to draw 
similar conclusions from our case studies in Timor-
Leste and Melanesia, although in these smaller 
countries, political participation is more likely to be 
mediated through personalised patronage networks 
than large-scale, class-based identities.
The Middle Class in Timor-Leste and 
Melanesia
Drawing on the overview above, how relevant is 
the concept of the middle class in Timor-Leste and 
Melanesia? Can a middle class in these countries 
be clearly identified? If so, is the middle class likely 
to behave in ways that are developmentally and 
politically significant? What economic, political, 
social and cultural values will the middle class in 
each country bring to bear on their societies and 
the region?
The following section draws on the analytical 
concepts identified in the previous section to make 
some preliminary assessments of the utility of the 
concept of the middle class for understanding 
the developmental and political transformations 
in Timor-Leste, PNG and Solomon Islands. The 
case studies will provide a comparative basis for 
assessing how different middle-class values and 
interests emerge from distinct contexts within a 
similar regional setting (in contrast to normative 
global middle-class experiences).
Papua New Guinea
PNG is a country of extremes of wealth and 
poverty, with social inequality exacerbated by 
the recent economic boom driven primarily by 
the construction phase of the Papua New Guinea 
Liquefied Natural Gas (PNG LNG) Project (UNDP 
2014). Growing resource rents have underpinned 
shifts in what was a highly aid-dependent state to 
a more regionally assertive and confident state. 
This is exemplified in PNG’s shift from heavy aid 
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dependence to its sometime role as an aid donor to 
Melanesian neighbours such as Solomon Islands, 
where PNG has funded roads and contributed 
to flood relief. PNG’s scale, growing wealth and 
political complexity mean that traditional donors 
such as Australia and New Zealand are less able 
to exert a significant influence on development 
directions than in the past.
The resource boom has given rise to significant 
economic growth in other sectors, notably 
communications, construction and retail (Oxford 
Business Group 2014), enabling new forms of 
formal employment that are conducive to the 
consolidation of a middle class. Most of this growth 
is concentrated in Port Moresby, the national 
capital and PNG’s largest city.
Economic development is also fuelling new 
forms of self-identification. Recently constructed 
retail centres, such as the Vision City Mega Mall 
in Waigani, opened by the Malaysian logging giant 
Rimbunan Hijau in 2011, have created new spaces 
where the citizens of Port Moresby may adopt 
consumer and leisure practices such as shopping, 
eating in cafes or seeing Hollywood blockbusters 
in a cinema that are now typical of the middle 
classes globally (Burger, Louw et al. 2015). Where 
anthropologists (e.g. Foster 2002; Gewertz and 
Errington 1999) have previously documented the 
development of class distinction in PNG through 
modern patterns of consumption and social life, 
this has been largely understood within a national 
framework. Contemporary developments suggest 
that the new middle class of PNG will have a 
much more global outlook in its consumer tastes 
and other values than before (cf. Besnier 2009; 
Cox and Macintyre 2014). Stella magazine, a 
successful women’s lifestyle magazine initiated by 
a middle-class PNG entrepreneur, articulates these 
cosmopolitan values among a new generation 
of educated women (Spark 2014, 2015). New 
consumer orientations and tastes notwithstanding, 
middle-class Papua New Guinean values and 
aspirations are usually articulated in Christian 
language, particularly in its Pentecostal forms that 
are oriented towards global images of personal 
prosperity (Cox 2014c; McDougall 2013).
Since the entry of Digicel into PNG’s 
telecommunications sector in 2007, the use 
of mobile phones and other information and 
communication technologies have grown rapidly 
in urban centres and across the country, greatly 
expanding the possibilities of business and 
interpersonal communication and networking 
(Lipset 2013; Suwamaru 2014). Use of Facebook in 
PNG has increased tenfold in the past four years 
(Cox 2014b). Facebook and other social media, 
particularly blogs, have created a vibrant public 
sphere where much middle-class political debate 
now takes place (Logan 2012).
Newly built apartment blocks and suburban 
developments cater to some of the housing needs 
of the middle class in Port Moresby. Some middle-
class people have enough money to invest in urban 
real estate, often buying land and then building 
housing on it. At the same time, the limited supply 
of land and high costs of housing in Port Moresby 
and other urban centres mean that many Papua 
New Guineans, even those in regular professional 
employment, live in peri-urban informal 
settlements, securing land in informal agreements 
with customary landowners (Sharp et al. 2015).
Nevertheless, the nature of economic 
development in PNG has a high degree of precarity. 
The high cost of living in Port Moresby and PNG 
generally is a regular lament of middle-class 
Papua New Guineans (e.g. Kowa 2011). Where 
previous generations of public servants and 
other professional workers could expect to have 
a reasonably high standard of living, including 
access to formal housing in the urban centres, now 
there is a pervasive feeling that PNG’s ‘working 
class’, as middle-class wage earners are increasingly 
describing themselves, are missing out on the 
nation’s economic prosperity (Cox 2014a). These 
complaints often take the form of critiques of 
corruption among the nation’s leaders but, to date, 
have only occasionally translated into political 
mobilisation around specific issues.
Equally, economic development has not 
significantly changed the nature of political 
participation. Political mobilisation remains an 
extremely difficult task in the context of PNG’s 
persistently clientelistic political system (Kurer 
2007). For politicians, political advantage is 
determined not in a liberal public realm where 
they are called to account for their decisions but in 
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the securing of support from their clients through 
petty disbursements of cash and other incentives. 
The political system has a profound bias towards 
the rural population and many town dwellers 
return ‘home’ to the provinces to vote. Consistent 
with Khan’s (2010) concept of the intermediary 
class, many professional men (and some women) 
consider running for office ‘at home’ as the end 
point of their careers. Few of them are successful 
but their engagement with the political system 
has historically focused on such attempts to enter 
the patronage system, rather than representing 
any distinct interests and values of the urban 
middle class.
In recent years, some political leaders have 
emerged embodying distinct middle-class values. 
The Governor of Port Moresby, the Hon. Powes 
Parkop, has introduced Yumi Lukautim Mosbi 
(Tok Pisin: ‘let’s look after Moresby’), an urban 
renewal project aimed at making Port Moresby 
more livable. The project has included improved 
public transport and children’s playgrounds 
among its various initiatives but its most notable 
focus has been on the appearance of the city, 
particularly in cleaning up rubbish and graffiti. 
Part of this attempt to clean up the city has been 
the Port Moresby ‘buai ban’, a criminalisation of 
the important informal sector betel nut economy. 
The rationale for the ban is based on the need to 
prevent the unsightly spit and rubbish produced 
by consumers but also includes public health 
arguments about mouth cancer and nutrition. 
The ban reflects middle-class perspectives which 
associate the informal economy with criminal 
activity (Sharp 2013).
Solomon Islands
Unlike PNG, where economic growth is 
underpinning the emergence of a new middle 
class, in Solomon Islands constrained economic 
development has arguably constituted a check on 
the development of a middle class. On the face of it, 
the structural basis for an emergent middle class in 
Solomon Islands appears weak. One of the largest 
countries among the island states of the Pacific, 
with a population of some 550,000, Solomon 
Islands is an economically underdeveloped, low-
income country still trying to overcome the ravages 
of the civil conflict (known as ‘the tensions’) 
suffered from 1998 to 2003 (Barbara 2014). Some 
80 per cent of the population relies on subsistence 
or semi-subsistence agriculture and fishing for their 
livelihoods (World Bank 2010:2). The country is 
struggling to develop its basic industrial and service 
sectors. The country is heavily reliant on primary 
exports, such as copra, timber, fish and palm oil. 
Solomon Islands has a small retail, construction and 
manufacturing sector within a fragile private sector 
that may lack the scale required to sustain a sizeable 
middle class (Humanitarian Futures Program 2013). 
Solomon Islands is highly aid dependent, and is 
expected to remain so for many decades. In 2012, 
overseas development assistance was equivalent 
to one-third of Solomon Islands’ annual GDP, or 
USD300 million (World Bank 2013:12).
Solomon Islands’ economic structure provides 
a limited foundation for an emergent middle 
class. There are a limited number of skilled jobs 
available that might be considered middle class. 
According to the 2009 census, there were only 
43,000 formal sector jobs in Solomon Islands out 
of a combined total of 208,000 jobs, including 
informal and subsistence employment. Most formal 
non-farm sector jobs were unskilled. According 
to Curtain (2013:27): ‘Only one-in-four (26 per 
cent) occupations are in the top three skill levels. 
Professionals account for nearly one-in-five 
(18 per cent) of the non-farm workforce. These are 
occupations that in most instances require a post-
secondary qualification.’
While not accounting for the majority of formal 
jobs, public sector jobs are arguably those most 
likely to sustain a local middle class. While there 
are many low-skilled public sector jobs, securing 
higher level managerial jobs in the public sector 
is a key way of entering Solomon Islands’ small 
middle class. Public sector jobs are highly sought 
after and jealously guarded once obtained, not the 
least because of their relatively generous benefits 
and continuity. Most senior public service jobs are 
based in Honiara, with provincial governments 
under-resourced (Cox and Morrison 2004).
Solomon Islands also has a small but influential 
‘intermediary class’, comprising overseas tertiary 
educated professionals who work in the interstices 
of the state, donor and logging economies, 
mediating economic and political relationships, 
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oftentimes on behalf of international donors 
and international corporations (Hameiri 2012). 
Hameiri (2012:418) notes the emergence of a group 
of educated individuals ‘with networks beyond 
the village’ that have emerged to broker logging 
agreements between companies and villages, taking 
a share for themselves. Such individuals have the 
resources and social connections necessary to 
support middle-class lifestyles.
While much sought after, many public service 
jobs are nevertheless low skilled and incapable 
of supporting a middle-class lifestyle. It is at the 
higher end of the public service where public 
servants can begin to be considered middle class. 
The public sector basis of the Solomon Islands 
middle class suggests it will enjoy a degree of 
security. Indeed, the importance of public sector 
employment in Solomon Islands’ weak social 
protection framework has seen public sector 
numbers inflated and made efforts to reform the 
public service difficult. Senior public sector jobs 
can, however, be very precarious. Middle and 
upper level public service managers, along with 
the burgeoning number of local political advisers 
brought to office when their political patrons 
are elected, must be situated within a broader 
patronage economy. Obtaining high public service 
office can be lucrative. Many senior public servants 
use their position to leverage political careers 
(Corbett and Wood 2013). But the vicissitudes 
of public life also go some way to explaining the 
ephemeral nature of the middle class, with the 
economic and political fortunes of middle-class 
senior public servants waxing and waning with the 
fortunes of political patrons.
Deepening urbanisation in Solomon Islands, 
concentrated in Honiara which accounts for 
some 20 per cent of the national population, 
provides another, albeit limited, foundation for a 
local middle class (Gooberman-Hill 1999). With 
an annual urban growth rate of 4.7 per cent, 
Solomon Islands has one of the highest rates of 
urban growth in the Pacific (UN Habitat 2012:7). 
Rural–urban migration is the main force driving 
urbanisation in the country (ibid.:12), with the 
urban population estimated to be around 25 per 
cent of the total population by 2020 (ibid.:11). But 
urbanisation has been poorly managed, with urban 
life for many being precarious. According to UN 
Habitat (2012:12), ‘rapid urban growth is evident 
in the prolific growth of informal settlements, peri-
urban villages and the informal sector’ such that 
the ‘growth rate of informal settlements (estimated 
to be more than 6 per cent per annum) exceeds 
the urban growth rate’. In Honiara, informal 
settlements account for an estimated 35 per cent of 
its population.
The nature of urbanisation in Solomon Islands 
militates against an expansive and politically 
engaged middle class. Craig and Porter (2014) argue 
that while the urban predominance of Honiara 
as the centre of political and economic power in 
Solomon Islands should intuitively result in an 
influential middle class, an anti-urban political 
bias and an electoral gerrymander favouring the 
predominantly rural population — reflected in a 
highly clientelistic form of politics (Cox 2009) — 
means that most economic rents are distributed 
away from the capital and the emergent middle class 
are marginalised from substantive power. According 
to Craig and Porter:
the weak incentives to allocate urban citizens 
more resources or political power undermines 
the emergence of a property-owning middle 
class and impacts on how power is ordered 
… Urban middle class actors, business people 
and public servants, are largely excluded from 
wider political pacting, party formation, and 
settlement. (Craig and Porter 2014:12)
While its economic and urban foundations may 
be weak, it is possible to discern important shifts 
in consumption patterns and values that indicate 
a tenuous, but nevertheless emergent middle-class 
identity. Most notable is the obvious impact of 
new internet technologies on social and cultural 
life. Mobile coverage has increased significantly, 
rising from 21 per cent in 2010 to 60 per cent in 
2012 (Logan 2014), enabling increasing numbers 
of Solomon Islanders to engage with, or aspire to, 
middle-class lifestyles and values. The internet has 
also enabled greater access to financial services, 
facilitating greater levels of entrepreneurialism 
and improved access to the formal economy 
(Humanitarian Futures Program 2013:14).
The position of Solomon Islands’ middle class in 
the senior echelons of the public sector and business 
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suggests it may be politically influential. However, 
there is limited evidence that it is politically liberal. 
Middle-class public servants are more likely to be 
implicated in patronage politics rather than to be 
a highly progressive force for liberalisation and 
accountability. That said, internet technologies have 
enabled some new forms of civic participation, 
which may speak to a more progressive activism. 
Most notable is the Facebook-based Forum 
Solomon Islands International, whose membership 
is composed of an urban-based elite concerned 
with issues of political accountability (Finau et al. 
2014; Wood 2015). This forum has become one of 
the few places in Solomon Islands where citizens 
discuss what may be called a middle-class agenda 
centred on issues of nation-building, political 
reform and development.
Solomon Islands has a middle class, but it is 
small, precarious and implicated in a local political 
economy which militates against liberal political 
participation. Moreover, the fragility of Solomon 
Islands’ economy, its dependency on aid, and its 
limited growth prospects mean the middle class 
is likely to remain small. Urbanisation and the 
globalising impact of emergent technologies may 
support the emergence of a new generation of 
middle-class citizens, but the impact at this stage 
appears small.
Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste is a resource-rich but lower middle 
income economy in which growing state oil and 
gas revenues are driving processes of urbanisation, 
private sector development and state-consolidation. 
Economic growth above 10 per cent per annum 
from 2007 to 2012, driven by government spending 
of returns on USD16 billion petroleum fund, 
has fostered a small, urbanised and potentially 
fragile commercial middle class, highly dependent 
on government infrastructure and construction 
development contracts. Modest jobs growth has 
likewise been driven by the expansion of public 
sector employment, estimated at some 40,000. 
Timor’s National Strategic Development Plan 
(Government of Timor-Leste 2011) cites the need 
for extensive public investment to promote a 
local business sector as a long-term development 
strategy. These small, emerging classes are highly 
urbanised: the Timor-Leste Demographic and 
Health Survey 2009–10 found the top income 
quintile included 58 per cent of the urban 
population but only 9 per cent of those in rural 
areas (NSD and ICF Macro 2010). By contrast, 
subsistence farming remains the predominant 
economic activity of up to 75 per cent of the 
national population.
Timor-Leste is highly dependent on oil and 
gas revenue, which constitute 95 per cent of state 
revenue. It strongly exhibits the characteristics 
of a rentier state, in which the state is the prime 
intermediary between the oil and gas sector, and 
the rest of the economy. Revenues are a prime 
source of capital expenditure and the major driver 
of employment growth (Neves 2013), both in 
terms of public sector employment and indirectly 
through construction contracts. One-third of 
national private sector employment comes from the 
construction industry, estimated to provide 20,000 
jobs (Neves 2013). Some 80 per cent of private 
sector jobs are based in Dili, with the remaining 
12 districts sharing the balance. Tax collection is 
generally ineffective, a feature which also limits 
the development of some norms of political 
accountability between taxpayers and the state. The 
judicial sector is generally regarded as a weak state 
institution, plagued by inadequate training, judicial 
shortages, and translation issues making contract 
enforcement a slow and unpredictable process. 
Timor-Leste’s high-cost low-skills economy is 
proving difficult to diversify, with economic activity 
continuing to centre on public sector spending 
of finite oil and gas revenues, raising the spectre 
of the ‘resource curse’, in which development of 
other more sustainable industries is neglected, 
and maladies such as political corruption and 
clientelism may be facilitated.
The government’s approach to economic 
development relies on large-scale spending to 
‘fast-track’ infrastructure projects and to promote 
development of an entrepreneurial class, both 
in terms of attracting foreign investors to large 
projects and a local entrepreneurial class to smaller 
projects. To this end, recent budgets have focused 
on infrastructure spending — mostly in the 
form of contracts let to the private sector — and 
representing some 40 per cent of the 2014 budget. 
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By comparison, expenditures on education (11 per 
cent), health (5 per cent) and agriculture (2 per 
cent) have been modest despite the latter sector 
still representing the majority of East Timorese 
subsistence livelihoods. A relatively small number 
of contractors with strong political connections, 
including former veterans of Timor-Leste’s long 
independence struggle, are key recipients of state 
contracts. Pension payments to veterans are also 
a particular focus, representing 5.8 per cent of 
the 2013 budget, a figure which exceeded the 
monies spent on the security sector. Beyond this, 
claims that other infrastructure contracts had 
been proffered to less celebrated figures — with a 
history of involvement in civil unrest or criminal 
activities — led some commentators to claim that 
the government’s strategy was to ‘buy’ peace (ICG 
2013), to ensure stability in the short- to mid-term 
as Timor-Leste recovered from the debilitating 
2006 political–military crisis. In sum, these 
developments point to a deepening urban–rural 
divide, and the emergence of a small but wealthy 
middle class, highly dependent on state largesse 
and with distinctly clientelistic ties to politically 
powerful groups, and supportive of the political 
status quo (ICG 2013).
Timor-Leste’s new middle classes comprise 
several numerically small but politically significant 
groups, whose own recycling of state rents creates 
wider networks of obligation and patronage. Aside 
from the veterans and other favoured recipients 
of infrastructure contracts, these include a small 
commercial class, represented by the Chamber of 
Commerce. The wealthiest among these groups 
own properties in Timor and also in ‘prestige’ 
locations like Bali. Among this group, sometimes 
overlapping, are the ‘old’ Chinese business class of 
Timor that dominated commerce in the colonial 
era and still retain significant properties. Smaller 
again is the dynastic elite of older Mestiço families, 
the remnant of a colonial elite whose ownership of 
significant parcels of now valuable land, including 
some coffee plantations, survived the Indonesian 
interregnum. Significant too are the foreign middle 
class, dominated by Portuguese and Australian 
expatriates and ‘new’ Chinese investors from 
the People’s Republic of China, who are strongly 
visible in Dili and through the course of a decade 
of state-building became firmly enmeshed in the 
local economy, providing an important source of 
employment for Timorese security firms, domestic 
workers and nannies. Each of these groups is 
instrumental to newer forms of consumer culture 
evident in Dili, exemplified by Timor Plaza, and its 
projection of an international middle-class lifestyle. 
Finally, the large group of 40,000 East Timorese 
public servants form an important national lower 
middle class, and a main object of aspiration for 
domestic university graduates, signalling the critical 
importance of state-based employment on middle-
class formation.
Conclusion: Is the Concept of the Middle 
Class Useful in the Pacific?
Consideration of the role and significance of the 
middle class in contemporary analysis of political 
and developmental change in Timor-Leste, PNG 
and Solomon Islands has been minimal. This 
reflects the general assumption that the concept 
of the middle class is largely irrelevant in a region 
understood through predominantly traditional 
and subsistence terms. Such an omission fails to 
engage with the very significant transitions that are 
discernible across the region over the past decade.
Taking a broad definition of the middle class, 
using the measures identified above (income; 
occupation, skills and education; vulnerability; 
self-identification; urbanisation and political 
participation), it is possible to discern the basis 
of an emergent middle class in each of the three 
country case studies. Significant transitions across 
the region, including resource (or aid)-driven 
economic growth, regional integration and the 
impact of social media, are resulting in significant 
structural shifts capable of sustaining an emergent 
middle class. A cursory familiarity with the three 
case study countries provides ample evidence of 
significant shifts in consumer habits, education and 
life strategies for urban-based citizens, which align 
strongly with expected middle-class aspirations and 
behaviours.
What is not known is the scale of the emergent 
middle class in each country. Further empirical 
research embracing a multidimensional approach 
to understanding the middle class is required to 
make more definitive assessments within individual 
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national contexts. It is clear, however, that the 
middle class, as an increasingly important social 
group, is likely to shape processes of political and 
developmental change and the construction of 
new political settlements. The different economic 
and social foundations upon which the emergent 
middle class may be based are likely to result in 
quite distinct middle-class formations in each 
country. In Timor-Leste, oil-based growth and 
a once strong tradition of elite cooperation in 
the face of colonial oppression could yet result 
in a more developmental middle class who exert 
political influence in ways similar to the East 
Asian experience, pending the outcome of recently 
moderating intra-elite tensions. In Solomon 
Islands, high aid dependence and the importance of 
state-based employment manifest in a more muted 
middle class dependent upon prevailing socio-
political arrangements. In PNG, rapid increases 
in resource rents combined with weakening state 
structures may feed into a decoupled middle class, 
committed to economic development but with 
ambiguous connections to a central state.
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Endnotes
1 We use the ‘broader Pacific region’ as a gloss for 
Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea and Solomon 
Islands but intend the term to be flexible and 
potentially inclusive of other Pacific islands countries. 
Similarly, ‘Melanesia’ in this paper is shorthand for 
PNG and Solomon Islands.
2 Hildred Geertz (1963), writing of Indonesia, referred 
to this as the development of a ‘metropolitan 
superculture’, which comprised elements of political 
ideology, consumption patterns, everyday use of 
national rather than local language, facility with 
foreign languages and people.
3 Dili’s population grew from 100,715 in 1999, to 
173,541 in 2004; increasing again to 193,563 in 2010 
(RDTL 2010) despite the intervening influence of 
2006 political–military crisis.
4 Khan describes intermediate classes as those ‘that 
are not asset-rich to the extent that their incomes 
are primarily from rents, profits, interest or other 
components of the economic surplus, nor are they so 
asset-poor that their incomes primarily come from 
labour’ (Khan 2006:723).
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